Hofstra Law Review
Volume 33

Issue 4

Article 4

2005

Alleged Conflicts of Interest Because of the "Appearance of
Impropriety"
Ronald D. Rotunda

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Rotunda, Ronald D. (2005) "Alleged Conflicts of Interest Because of the "Appearance of Impropriety","
Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 33 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol33/iss4/4

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Rotunda: Alleged Conflicts of Interest Because of the "Appearance of Impro

ALLEGED CONFLICTS OF INTEREST BECAUSE
OF THE "APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY"
RonaldD. Rotunda*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Criticisms of lawyers for alleged ethical failings have become more
frequent over the years. Some of these charges are serious and welltaken, but others claim that there is an alleged conflict of interest
because of an "appearance of impropriety." The charge may be no more
substantial than a claim that a lawyer is a friend of someone, and that
friendship causes an appearance of impropriety leading to a conflict of
interest.
Yet the charge, even if unsubstantial, is serious. Any allegation of a
conflict of interest is a very serious matter, for it attacks the integrity and
bona fides of the person charged. As the ABA has advised, a charge of a
conflict of interest "should be viewed with caution ...for it can be
misused as a technique of harassment."'
Consider one of the earliest cases in the modem trend-the case of
John Erlenborn. President George H.W. Bush appointed Erlenbom, a
former member of Congress to the Board of the Legal Services
Corporation ("LSC"). Erlenbom was also a partner in a major law firm
that represented growers in disputes over farm workers' conditions; the
farm workers were often represented by LSC-funded lawyers. 3 The
* George Mason University Foundation Professor of Law, George Mason University School
of Law.
1. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 15 (pre-2002 version of the Model
Rules), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN, & RONALD D. ROTUNDA 2005 SELECTED STANDARDS
ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 188 (2005). The post-2002 version does not include this
comment, for reasons of style having nothing to do with substance, though many states continue to
retain this comment. See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 17.
2. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., BIOGRAPHY OF JomN N. ERLENBORN, available at
http://www.lsc.gov/welcome/welbios7.htm.
3. Anne Kornhauser, Sowing Client Discord, Reaping PoliticalFallout, LEGAL TIMES, June
25, 1990, at 1, 15.
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American Farm Bureau Federation, a private lobbying group
representing agricultural interests, began a campaign to persuade the
firm's agricultural clients (the Farm Bureau was not one of the firm's
clients) to object to what the Farm Bureau characterized as Erlenborn's
conflict of interest, for example, he took a position as an LSC board
member, that the Farm Bureau claimed was harmful to farm interests.4
Erlenbom offered to recuse himself from any decisions of the LSC
board that directly involved reform legislation that the Farm Bureau
supported, or that involved agricultural activities that could have an
impact on his firm's clients, but the Farm Bureau's objections (including
its objection to Erlenborn's proposed congressional testimony on the
reform legislation) continued until Erlenborn resigned from the LSC
board. 5 The then ABA President-elect said that there was no conflict of
interest that required Erlenborn's resignation.6 Rules 6.3 and 6.4 of the
ABA Model Rules, dealing with law reform activities that affect private
clients, make that clear.7 Nothing ethically required Erlenborn to resign
from the LSC board; it is understandable that his firm wanted to please
some of its clients. The consequence of this charge, too freely made, is
that it may have tarred a person's reputation, cost the government the
benefit of the former Congressman's advice, and increased the cost of
future pro bono work (measured by the attacks one must be willing to
suffer).8
Charges based on allegations of an "appearance of impropriety"
have increased at a rapid rate, as any search through Lexis or Westlaw
will demonstrate. For example, in 2003, the phrase appears 922 times in
the Westlaw database of "all news plus wires." 9 In 2004 (the most recent
full year), it appears 1698 times.' 0 In 2005, the charge could appear over
2300 times if it keeps up at the present rate. It is the buzz phrase of
choice.

4. Id. at 15.
5. Id.
6. Id.at 16.
7.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.3-6.4 (2005).

8.

See John S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts ofInterest, 71 TEx. L. REV. 457, 533
(1993) ("Such public-interest activities are crucial to the proper functioning of the legislative
process: lawyers who specialize in a particular practice area are important sources of information
about abuses and needed amendments that in turn serve societal interests.").
9. WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS Database (last searched Aug. 31, 2005), available at
WESTLAW:ALLNEWSPLUS/search: "appearance of impropriety" & DA(AFT 12/31/2002 & BEF
1/1/2004).
10. WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS Database (last searched Aug. 31, 2005), available at
WESTLAW:ALLNEWSPLUS/search: "appearance of impropriety" & DA(AFT 12/31/2003 & BEF
1/1/2005).
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II.

"APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY"

Is it really an appearance of impropriety for a lawyer to take a
position in one case while having a friendship with a lawyer on the other
side, or for the lawyer to take a personal position on a legal issue that is
adverse to a position that one of the lawyer's clients favors? May a
lawyer, for example, represent a tobacco or alcohol company and still
personally oppose smoking or drinking?
There is a fair amount of law on this topic and it does not favor
those who loosely bandy about the charge of an "appearance of
impropriety."
Consider, for example, the situation where a lawyer openly takes a
public position on a controversial issue that is contrary to the views of
some or all of that lawyer's clients. The American Law Institute's
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers concludes that there
is no conflict and that "[c]onsent of the lawyer's clients is not
required."'" Lawyers bring to each of their clients "professional
detachment.""12 For example, "if tax lawyers advocating positions about
tax reform were obliged to advocate only positions that would serve the
positions of their present clients, the public would lose the objective
contributions to policy making of some persons most able to help. 13
Perhaps it is bad business for the lawyer to advocate tax reform that
may not be consistent with the interests of one or more clients, but that
does not make the lawyer's pro bono advocacy unethical. It is one thing
for a client to charge that the lawyer is making a mistake; it is quite
another for the client to charge that the lawyer is acting unethically. The
client can always fire the lawyer, but lawyers are not fungible (at least,
good ones are not).
The ALI reflects the long-held view of the ABA, most recently
expressed in the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 6.4,
which provides that the lawyer need not secure client consent to
participate in a decision that hurts a client, but she should disclose to the
legal reform group that the decision will help a present client (although
she need not identify the name of the private client).1 4 Similarly, the fact
that a lawyer represents a client, whether pro bono or fee-based, implies
nothing about what the lawyer's personal beliefs are.' 5
11.
12.
13.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 cmt. e (2000).
Id.
Id.

14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 6.4 (2005).
15. Id. at R. 1.2(b). Similar sentiments are found in the predecessor to the Model Rules. See
MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-17, 8-1, 8-2, 8-4 (1983).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 4 [2005], Art. 4
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 33:1141

Let us assume that the lawyer represents Alpha Corporation in
negotiations with the Internal Revenue Service. The lawyer wants the
IRS to permit Alpha Corporation to employ accelerated depreciation
methods for machinery purchased in a prior tax year. While the lawyer is
negotiating, she personally believes that the accelerated depreciation
laws for manufacturing equipment are unwise public policy. Because of
her beliefs, she is also working with a bar association committee to
develop a policy statement against the accelerated depreciation
allowance. Indeed, let us further assume that the committee chair has
requested this lawyer to testify before Congress in support of the report
and its proposal to repeal all depreciation allowances. This new
legislation, (like typical tax enactments) would apply only for current
and future tax years, thus not directly affecting Alpha Corporation's case
before the IRS. Even though the proposed legislation is against Alpha's
economic interests, the ALI advises that the lawyer, without Alpha's
consent, may continue to represent Alpha while 16
simultaneously working
to repeal the accelerated depreciation allowance.
Assume a lawyer works for a government agency, and her boss tells
her that she may not attend a public hearing because her views on a
policy are contrary to the views of the agency and he is afraid that one of
the legislators at the hearing will see her in the audience and call her to
testify. The caselaw is still clear. Johnston v. Koppes held that the
supervisor may not sanction the government lawyer-employee for
private-policy positions that she advocates.' 7 "Loyalty to a client
requires subordination of a lawyer's personal interests when acting in a
professional capacity. But loyalty to a client does not require
extinguishment of a lawyer's deepest convictions" when acting in a
private capacity.1 8 In this example, the lawyer attended the hearing in her
private capacity, making her attendance appropriate.
Any other rule would change the practice of law and the public
activities of lawyers dramatically. Practicing lawyers are typically
members of the committees that draft new rules of civil or criminal
procedure. All of these lawyers would be disqualified because whatever
rules they propose will affect their present clients, some adversely.
If there is a conflict in this fact situation, no lawyer who was ever
planning to work in the private sector could serve as counsel to, or
witness for, a House or Senate tax committee, or testify before the

16.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 125 illus. 6 (2000).

17. See Johnston v. Koppes, 850 F.2d 594 (9th Cir. 1988).
18.

Id. at 596 (emphasis added).
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Internal Revenue Service about new laws or regulations affecting taxes.
Not only would new tax laws or regulations affect that lawyer's future
private clients, the new laws or regulations would also directly affect the
taxes that the lawyer himself will have to pay.
One law professor has advocated that senators at judicial
confirmation hearings should examine why lawyers accepted certain
clients, because "[a] lawyer's decision to take a case that he knows will
involve the making of certain kinds of arguments may also be probative
of his beliefs." 1 9 Under this view, senators should seek to intuit how the
nominee might vote by taking into account the clients whom the lawyer
has represented. Is this not another way of asking whether we should
punish nominees because of the clients they have represented? The
ethics rules do not support guilt by association.
For many decades, lawyers have argued that we should not judge
lawyers by their clients, because of a basic principle of legal ethics-that
lawyers have every right (and duty) to defend clients, even members of
the Communist Party or the Ku Klux Klan, in spite of the fact that those
lawyers strongly disapprove of those organizations or their beliefs. The
fact that a lawyer may defend guilty people and secure their acquittal, or
the fact that a lawyer is successful in his legal arguments, is not
"probative of his beliefs. 20 Yet, there are those who argue that we must
unlearn all this learning, and-this is the surprise-law professors are
leading the charge. In fact, as Model Rule 1.2(b) makes clear, a lawyer's
representation of a client, whether pro bono or fee-based, implies
nothing about a lawyer's personal beliefs.2'
The ABA Model Rules, and the state rules that are based on them,
give us specific rules that govern real conflicts of interest. A concern
about appearances of impropriety to the educated observer is a reason
why some of the strict rules prohibit certain conflicts, or allow certain
types of representation only after a client's informed consent.22 While
the "appearance of impropriety" is a reason for some of these specific
rules, it is too vague and too ad hominem to be a real rule itself.

19. Vikram Amar, How Do You Think?: Ideology and the Judicial Nominee, LEGAL TIMES,
July 9, 2001, at 50.
20. Id.
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2005).
22. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION

Those who claim that there is some sort of conflict in situations
involving friendship or public statements about policy matters do not
refer to any rules, regulations, case law, or ethics opinions to support
their charge. That is because the law on this subject all points the other
way. Consequently, those who raise this charge are left with asserting
that something must be wrong, even if they cannot explain why. They
rely on the "appearance of impropriety."
The rules of ethics governing lawyers are an actual body of law,
usually adopted by the courts of each jurisdiction. They are just as much
law as the Rules of Civil Procedure, or the regulations of the Internal
Revenue Service. And because they are law, they do not make an action
unethical because someone makes a loose charge and argues that there is
a "conflict" if a lawyer could string together a, series of events and then
conclude that there must be something wrong. If there is no impropriety,
some people argue, there must be an appearance of impropriety. Yet the
courts have concluded otherwise.
However, as the Second Circuit advised over a quarter of a century
ago: "When dealing with ethical principles,... we cannot paint with
broad strokes. The lines are fine and must be so marked.... [T]he
conclusion in a particular case can be reached only after
painstaking
23
analysis of the facts and precise application of precedent.,
The ABA Model Rules, prior to the 2002 revisions, specifically
rejected the supposed "appearance of impropriety" standard as a nontest, deeming it "question-begging. 2 4 The 2002 revisions do not repeat
that language because the drafters thought it unnecessary. Perhaps the
drafters should have looked at how frequently and freely people resort
to, and charge, the "appearance of impropriety."
The ABA has warned that if the "appearance of impropriety"
language had been made a disciplinary rule, "it is likely that the
determination of whether particular conduct violated the rule would have
degenerated.., into a determination on an instinctive, ad hoc or even ad
hominem basis .... ,25 Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., the reporter for
the original ABA Model Rules, has referred to the old "appearance of

23.

Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 227 (2d Cir. 1977).

24. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 cmt. 5, reprintedin RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
THOMAS D. MORGAN, 2005 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 193 (2005).

25.

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 342 n.17 (1975), discussed

in RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (7th ed. 2004).
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impropriety" standard "as a 'garbage' standard., 26 His choice of words
may not be eloquent, but they are certainly unambiguous.

26. ABA/BNA LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 13:31-32 (1997).
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